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The method by which allocations are distributed in the inshore shrimp fishery in Shrimp Fishing
Areas (SFA) 5, 6 and 7, on the northeast coast ofNewfoundland and Labrador is a set of
..harvesting caps" allocated after the setting ofa Total Allowable Catch (TAC) by the
Department ofFisheries and Oceans. This system has been in place since temporary permits to
harvest the catch were made permanent in 2007. Caps are viewed theoretically as allowing
harvesters and managers to come together in making decisions regarding the harvest, allowing a
sense ofautonomy and cooperation, while also helping avoid some ofthe theoretical issues
facing other allocation regimes. This paper revisits harvesting caps in this fishery four years
after the regime's implementation and suggests that harvesting caps may be bringing issues of
their own to the industry. An approach aimed toward co-management, while also ensuring the
state is incorporated, may better serve the industry in ensuring the resource is harvested
responsibly for all involved.
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1.0 Introduction
This paper examines the current allocation system of harvesting caps for the inshore
northern shrimp industry in northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador, namely in shrimp fishing
areas (SFA) 5, 6 and 7. Caps are set based on a total allowable catch determined by the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) that is then redistributed as a series of caps by the
Fish, Food and Allied Workers (FFAW) Union and its members. The main focus of the paper is
to re-evaluate the current system's effectiveness as an alternative to more common management
regimes of individual quotas and individual transferable quotas, and raise questions regarding an
apparent flaw of competitiveness in the regime. This flaw is due largely to the debate regarding
open access and a failure of theorists to delineate common property and open access as not one
ideological framework but as two separate theoretical bases for looking at a resource.
What follows is a brief discussion of northern shrimp, the inshore northern shrimp
industry in northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador l and current harvesting methods. Thjs is
followed by a description of the current system of allocations and harvesting caps and a
discussion of contemporary resource theory that focuses on questions of property, and how
common property and open access have become merged into one in theoretical debate. The
paper then uses alternative management regimes of individual quotas (lQs) and individual
transferrable quotas (ITQs) to illustrate more common resource management regimes but argues
'Whileasmallinshorefleetdidbegininthelate1970s,andcontinuestofishpresentday,harvestingintheGulfof
St. Lawrence and Scotian Shelf areas (4S and 4R),the majority ofthe inshore fleet, and the portion that is subject
to this paper, expanded inthe mid-to late-1990swith the issuance of temporary licenses in shrimp fishing areas 6
and7. This latter fleet began after a number of experimental fisheries and scientific surveys to determine the
potentialofacommercialfisheryfornorthernshrimpafterthecollapseofthe northern cod stocks. These licenses
were later made permanent in 2007. The Gulfand Scotian Shelf fisheries have existed since the 1970sand are
harvested from vessels <100', whereas the northeastern NewfoundlandandLabradorinshorefisheryoperates
from vessels <65'. These fisheries are important but operate under individual quotas rather than harvesting caps
and are thus exempt from the focus of this paper, operating asa separatefleet in separate shrimp fishing areas.
these regimes also bring issues that cause problems for both harvesters and the market. The
paper concludes with a brief for co-management and how such a regime can help relieve some of
the pressures and issues caused by the current system of harvesting caps.
2.0 The Inshore Northern Shrimp Fishery in Newfoundland and Labrador
1.1 Northem Shrimp (Pwulnills borenli~)
Though numerous species of shrimp arc harvested worldwide. this paper examines one
particular species and fishery. namely the inshore fishery for northern shrimp in shrimp areas 5.
6 and 7 in northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador. Northern shrimp (Pandallls hnrealis) is
one of the main shellfish harvested in areas of Newfoundland and Labrador. though the species is
also fished in other areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Occans.
Figure 2.1: Northern shrimp (Pandallis borealis)
(Source: Department of Fisheries alld Oceans 2007a)
Northern shrimp can be found in the Atlantic Ocelm in the GulfofSt. Lawrence. on both
the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador coasts. in the Davis Strait. the Gulf of Maine.
cast of Greenland. and in the northeast Atlantic including the Norwegian. Barents and North
seas. The species can be found in the Pacific Ocean ofT Japan as far north as the Bering Sea and
from the Aleutian Islands south to the Washington-Oregon coast, as indicated in the graphic
below (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2oo9b).
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Figure 2.2: Lo<:arion ofNor/hern shrimp world-wide
(Source: Depor/lllem of Fisheries and Oceons 10070)
Pandalus borealis is a cold water species and, in the Atlantic, thrive in tempemtures
varying from 2°C to 6°C. Shrimp arc most commonly found in areas where the ocean bottom is
soH and muddy (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009b). While approximately 30 different
species of shrimp are found in Canadian waters. DFO states that northern shrimp is the most
abundant ofthesc species. Approximately 97% of commercial shrimp fishing consists of
northern shrimp harvesting (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009b). Northern shrimp has
been fished commercially in Canada for over 40 years (Department of Fisheries and Oceans,
2009b) and the beginning of the northern shrimp industry in NewfoW1dland and Labrador is
attributed to government exploratory work in the late 1960s. Since the 1960s and 1970s the
northern shrimp fishery has continued to increase in value2 and Canada is the world's leader in
shrimp production (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009b).
2.2 Harvesting Northern Shrimp in Northeastern Newfoundland & Labrador
Northern shrimp have been harvested in Canada since the 1970s. Northern shrimp are
landed fresh or frozen. After shrimp have been caught they are often sent to a processing plant
for cooking and peeling. This production can also take place on the trawlers if they are equipped
for such, as are many offshore trawlers that stay at sea for over a month (Department of Fisheries
and Oceans 2009b). The best harvesting groW1ds for northern shrimp exist at a depth of over 100
fathoms and hold a bottom water temperature of 4 to 6 degrees Celsius3 (Sinclair 1985:65).
While the aforementioned trawlers take part in a large part ofNewfoundland and Labrador's
shrimp harvesting industry, shrimp are also harvested from vessels that range up to 100 feet in
length. Newfoundland and Labrador's inshore shrimp fleet, the fleet that is the focus of this
paper, falls into this category, though the northeastern fleet consists of vessels <65 feet only.
2 DFO states that the value of the shrimp industry increased from $230 million to $350 million between 1997 and
2005. Foran illustration of how the industry has grown in value in recent years see Appendix II.
3Shallower depths bring a larger instance of smaller male shrimp, as shrimp begin life as males and mature and mate
into their third year. During this time shrimp molt and growth until they lay eggs in the fourth year. Mature females
are the shrimp targeted by the commercial Newfoundland northern shrimp industry (Sinclair 1985:65-6).
The majority of these vessels are between 50 and 65 lect. Vessel size and weather
conditions usually mean the fishery opemles from early April to October (Departmenl of
Fisheries and Oceans 2007a). DFO defines lhe operalions of shrimp enterprises as being "based
oul of ports in NAFO divisions 2J3KL and are established based on area ofrcsidence, by NAFO
division in the following manner; 2J, 3K north (north of50oJO'N), 3K soulh (south of 50oJO'N),
3L, 4R and 4$. The majority fish in SFA 6 and 7 with some effort in $FA 4 and 5" (Departmenl
of Fisheries and Oceans 2007a).
Figllre 2.3: Nor/hem shrimp fishing areas
(Sollree: Depor/men! ofFisheries and Oceans 2007)
These vessels are equipped with trawls (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009),
described as "a hydraulically powered trawl with mesh smaller than that used to trawl for other
species such as cod (Sinclair 1985:84). The trawl is similar to a large bag that is tapered at one
end. It is dragged along the sea bottom with one end open. The mesh is sized as to ensure
mainly the target species is caught (Sinclair 1985:84-5). These nets are made from polyethylene
twine and are kept to the seabed by heavy discs. Aluminum floats keep the "mouth" end open
(Sinclair 1985:85). Two "doors" keep the sides apart as they are released from both sides and
dragged along the front of the trawl (Sinclair 1985:85). Tows can last for four to five hours
(Sinclair 1985:91).
Since 1997 trawls are required to be equipped with a Nordmore Grate, a device allowing
larger fish to be released through the top of the grate in an effort to reduce the negative effects
shrimp trawling may have on the biomass of other species. Smaller shrimp are retained in the
end of the trawl while larger species that may be picked up as bycatch are able to make their way
through the top of the trawl. DFO insists mortality of other species has been notably reduced
since the Nordmore grate was made regulation (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2009b).
Figure 2../: Diagram o/shrimp lrawlusing a Nonlmore grale
(Source: Deparll1/enl a/Fisheries and Oceans 20070)
To ensure the fishery is harvested in a manner that is both sustainable and responsible,
DFO sets out a number of management measures that govern how the industry operates. As the
northern shrimp fishery operates under a policy of limited entry licensing, understanding the
tenns '"license," ..total allowable catch:' "quota" and "harvesting cap" is crucial to understanding
how the harvesting sector of the industry is managed. Before examining the theoretical
questions raised by the concept of harvesting caps, it is important to distinguish between the
license. total allowable catch, quota and harvesting cap, as a thorough understanding of each
tenn is necessary to understand how the management of the inshore northern shrimp industry
3.0 Licensing and Shrimp Allocations
3.1 Licensing Policy
The Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Atlantic Canada as issued by DFO in
1996 defines a fishing license as "an instrument by which the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans,
pursuant to his discretionary authority under the Fisheries Act, grants pern1ission to a person
including an aboriginal organization to harvest certain species offish or marine plants subject to
the conditions attached to the license" (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1996). It is
important to note that this definition also states that such a privilege is not a permanent one, is
temporary and is not a right or property. Renewal of this privilege is not guaranteed.
The Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada contains guidelines that
cover the licensing of individuals operating in fisheries using vessels <65', including the
majority of the inshore northern shrimp fishery. These guidelines state that: a license can be
issued to an individual fish harvester onll; license holders are required to fish their licenses
personally; only one license per species can be held by a fish harvesterS; the holder of the license
or the operator can authorize, in writing, and offer the request to a fishery officer or other
Departmental employee for approval, another person to utilize the license or use of the license on
another vessel only when circumstances are beyond his control; and, in the case of illness that
prevents the harvester from utilizing his license and upon receiving medical documentation
stating such, a license holder may designate a substitute operator6 (Department of Fisheries and
4Anexceptioncan be made to issue the license to a corporation on Iyunderthegrandfatherclause.
: ~~~i~~~~~,~:~~~~Z::i~;:e~r~ ~:~~~~ed from this guideline.
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Oceans 1996). Transferability, in definition, is not permitted7. If a harvester wishes to
relinquish a license he can do so only by having the license canceled. The Minister may issue a
license to an individua1 and to that individual only. If the harvester is unable to operate the
license or wishes to give the license up the license is then canceled and issued anew as a
replacement.
The inshore shrimp fishery we see on the northeastern coast ofNewfoundland and
Labrador has grown from a fishery that began as far back as the 1970s, though in other areas of
the province8. While a small inshore fleet did exist in the late I970s9 fishing in the Gulf of St.
Lawrence and Scotian Shelf areas (4S and 4R), the majority of the inshore fleet expanded in the
mid- to late-1990s with the issuance of temporary permits in shrimp fismng areas 6 and 7, later
made into permanent licenses in 2007. Regarding the potential ofa commercial inshore shrimp
fishery on the northeast coast that drew optimism in the 1990s, DFO stated,
In the 1990s, as the shrimp stocks grew in abundance and the cod moratorium came into
7 The Minister may, at his discretion, issue a new license as a replacement license when an old one has been
relinquished.
8 The Gulfand Scotian Shelf fisheries have existed since the 1970s and are harvested from vessels <100', whereas
~he northeastern Ne,:"foundland and Labra~or i~shore fishery, the subject of~his paper, op~rates from v~ssels <65'.
Exploratory fishenes had also been ongolllgslllcethe late 1950stodetermlllethepotenllalofharvestlllgnorthern
shrimp as an inshore commercial stock in various areas. The first planned survey took place in 1957-58 under
direction of the scientific personnel supplied by the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (Barrett 1972:1) and took
place in selected areas, namely GulfofSt. Lawrence, by the MY Fortune Breeze, funded by the Industrial
Development Service of DFO; the next survey was completed in 1967 under direction of the Industrial Development
Service in the Ramea area on Newfoundland's Southwest coast by the MY Penneyworth (Barrett 1972: I). In 1968-
69, on northwest coast from Cow Head to Point Riche and southwest coast around Ramea, exploratory surveys took
place via the MYs Penneyworth and Donna Louise (Barrett 1972: 1-2) and another survey took place in winter 1970
by the MY Straight Shore in SI. Mary's Bay. The purpose of the latter survey was to test commercial viability ofa
fishery and also to test various types of gear (Barrett 1972:2). A Portaux Choix survey by three longliners in 1970
was very successful and led to 1971's fishery consisting of 19 longliners (Barrett \972:2). The 197\ MY Alice
O'Brien survey in Fortune Bay, Hermitage Bay and SI. Mary's Bay, however, produced very discouraging results
(Barrett \972:2) and a 1971 Trinity Bay exploration terminated in December because of weather. Results were,
however, reasonably favourable (Barrett 1972:3)thoughtheoceanbottomwasfoundtobetooroughfordragging
(Barrett 1972:27).
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effect, temporary inshore licenses were introduced throughout Atlantic Canada giving priority
access to the under 65 feet fleet and to aboriginals. A three-year plan was announced in 1997
with significant quota increases for both the offshore and temporary inshore licenses. The Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) has doubled since the late 1990s, rising from 85,000t in 1998 to over
l60,000t in 2007. In 2006, DFO announced that additional access to the shrimp fishery would be
frozen to encourage stability in the short term. Additionally, in 2007, temporary licenses were
converted to regular licenses in an effort to further promote stability in the inshore fleet
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2009).
Requirements to be licensed are found in the Fisheries ActiO. In the early years, the
shrimp industry taking place in the Gulf and Scotian Shelf regions was placed wlder the policy of
limited entry licensing in 1976 11 • Harvesters knew the industry was increasing in value and
feared overcrowding. The offshore shrimp industry had already attempted to allay the same
fears. To attempt fleet reduction in the offshore fleet a utilization clause was added to the
licensing policy that stated a harvester must have had landed at least 70,000 pounds of shrimp in
1978 to retain his license in upcoming years (Sinclair 1985:67). In later years the policy for the
shrimp industry has followed suit with other fisheries policies and has become much more
sophisticated and managed. The inshore shrimp fishery on the northeast coast, according to
DFO, is conducted on a competitive basis with trip limits and harvesting caps determined and
subsequently managed by the industry (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2007a). Licensing
10 This Act is currently under revision.
II Access to the fishery had previously been open access, meaning there were no limits on how many vessels could
participate or how much of the resource could be harvested. Limited entry, according to DFO, "refers to those
fisheries where the total number of licences is limited" (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1996). Harvesters now
had to apply for, and begranted,accesstothe resource through thestate.
12
for northern shrimp has been restricted to core fish harvesters l2 who own a registered vessel and
who meet eligibility requirements laid out in the Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for
Atlantic Canada (1996)13.
3.2 Total Allowable Catches
DFO is responsible for setting the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC)14. In doing 0,
DFO aims to "use[s] Total Allowable Catch (TAC) in an effort to control the exploitation rate
index (catch (t) / fishable biomass from the previous year) which is a proxy for fishing mortality"
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2009). DFO monitors the state of northern shrimp stocks
by analyzing information obtained from harvesters, such as the number of males versus the
number of females harvested and total distribution of effort. Landings to processors are also
taken into account.
DFO also conducts its own independent surveys to help garner a firsthand look at shrimp
stocks. This information allows DFO to determine a Total Allowable Catch that is both
ecologically sustainable and able to help maintain the industry. Department of Fisheries and
Oceans tock information indicates that northern shrimp stocks are in good condition. DFO
indicates that overfishing is not an issue; stocks of cod and redfish, main predators of northern
shrimp, have declined considerably since the I990s; and environmental conditions seem to
12To be qualified as a core fish harvester a new entrant to the industrymust be a certified professional fish
harvester, meet the criteria to be considered full-time or as a new entrant under the Bonafide policy. Newfoundland
is an exception where the Level II Grandfathering criteria must be met (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1996).
13Licensing policy in the Newfoundland and Labrador Region presently prohibits the issuance of new commercial
otter and beam trawl shrimp permits (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2007a).
14 For a history of Total Allowable Catch allocations in the northern shrimp industry see Appendix I.
13
favour the survival of shrimp (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009).
3.3 Quota Allocations and Individual Quotas
Fisheries for other lucrative species in the northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador
fishing industry, such as snow crab, operate under a different allocation regime than that of the
northeastern northern shrimp fishery. These other species are allocated as a series of individual
quotas. Copes (1986) defines the individual quota as, "A fixed share of the catch allocated in
advance to individual operators (i.e., recognized fishermen, fishing units or fishing enterprises).
Allocations may be made for a single season (e.g. year), for a longer period, or in perpetuity"
(Copes 1986:279). Whereas open access drew out questions of overcapacity and overharvesting
in a fishery that is common property, these allocations attempt to allay these worries by placing
individual property rights on the resource. Licensing limits the inputs in a fishery to control the
harvest. Introduction of such management tools as individual quotas control the output. This
would, in rationale, put an end to the "race to the fish" that could result if allocations were
simply set as an overall total allowable catch that, once reached, would signal the end of the
harvest. Total allowable catch runs the risk of a build-up of competitive fleets, severe
overinvestment in manpower and equipment at the individual level (Copes 1986:279).
Individual quotas attempt to slow down this race and allot a percentage of the TAC 15 to
individual fish harvesters or enterprises.
Copes states that the main perceived benefit of introducing individual quotas to a fishery
is the elimination of potential diseconomies that come with open access and limited entTy
licensing. The benefits include elimination of the desire to race for the fish before the TAC is
15 Individual quotas are, according to Copes, usually a percentage of the TAC and dictate the quantity of the TAC a
harvester may take. While it isa percentage itis usually given asa set amount (Copes 1986:279).
14
clo ed. The rationale is that fi h harvesters will spread effort optimally over the season and
use manpower and equipment optimally. This will reduce the need for overinvestment. afety
will also be paramount as fish harvester will no longer feel the need to fish in bad weather
conditions. The risk of gluts would al 0 be Ie ened and harve ters would be able to take
advantage of patterns of demand in the marketplace (Copes 1986:280). As individual quota are
a form of property rights some proponents argue that one innate benefit of property right hould
be the ability to transfer, by lease or sale, all or a portion of these rights to others. It is this
question of transferability that bring forth potential problems that are often discussed when
these management regimes are considered.
Quota allocations in the in hore northern shrimp industry do not follow the same path as
allocations for other lucrative species, such as snow crab. Whereas snow crab follow a system of
Individual Quotas (IQs) that are granted to individual enterpri e , quota allocations for northern
shrimp are granted by harvesting area and are managed by the indu try in a series of "harvesting
caps'"
15
4.0 Shrimp Allocations in ortheast ewfoundland and Labrador
4.1 The Northeast Newfoundland and Labrador Shrimp Cap System
The inshore northern shrimp industry in northeastern ewfoundland and Labrador water
is managed as a competitive fishery by DFO. Beyond the setting of the Total Allowable Catch
and fleet shares, allocations are managed by the industry via a management tool described as
industry-managed harvesting caps 16. When the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is set harvesting
caps are distributed by key players within the industry, namely the Union and the province's
processors who are involved through the collective bargaining agreement.
This system, now in place as the current management regime, allows the FFAW to
di tribute the TAC as set by DFO as a series of harvesting 'caps' between a fleet in which the
TAC is divided and subsequently over-allocated amongst licensed harvesters in a fleet. A
system of caps refers to a practice ensuring a resource is harvested to its full potential while
attempting an equitable share anlongst harvesters. In over-allocating the quota and dividing this
allocation equally amongst users, managers take into consideration that harvesting caps will
likely not be exhausted (numerically) by the time the season is closed and the TAC is reached.
16 It is worthy of note that, since the beginning of the inshore fisherythroughtheinitiaiisslianceoftelllporary
perlllits,DFOstatedthat,"lnaccordancewiththeprinciplesdevelopedinconsultationwithindllstry,allallocations
since 1997 have been provided on a temporary basis, based on the "last in,firstollt"(LIFO)principle.lnother
words, sholiid there be a decline in theabllndance of the reSOUfce in the future; qllotaallocations will be removed
frolll the fishery in reverse order of their application" (Department ofFisheriesandOceans2007a).
16
Tonnage is thus left in the water, in theory, when in reality the resource has been over-allocated
initially. Individually, each harvester is able to fish and be paid up until the exhaustion of the
individual cap, with trip limits set on how much can be landed at a time. Each cap comes with a
set overall tolerance on each trip limit that is agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement
by the FFAW (the tolerance has generally been set at 10,000 lb) and is a cushion for the season
(over-allocation). When the TAC has been fished to 100% the fishery is closed by DFO, despite
the amount of caps set usually resting at 110% or 120% of the TAC as to provide the
aforementioned 'tolerance' and to push for high harvesting output (Decker 2011).
The decision to move the Eastern Newfoundland and Labrador shrimp fishery to a system
of caps sternnled from the early days of the fishery and problems emerging from the
management of the fishery at that time. David Decker of the FFAW states that the fishery began
with the first northeastern quotas in 1997 and was a competitive fishery, without licenses, and
open to any harvester who geared his vessel for the fishery (Decker 2011). The first few years of
the harvest, however, proved problematic. Too many harvesters were landing too much shrimp
and glutting plants.
Fish harvesters on the northeast coast were accustomed to a system of Individual Quotas
llsed in fisheries for other species (i.e. snow crab). Decker asserts that introducing a system of
lQs brought forth three problems: firstly, the most prominent problem with introducing a
licensing system oflQs, as was being used in the shrimp fishery on the northwest coast, was the
licensing fee. A license for a competitive fishery (i.e. one operated under harvesting caps) costs
a harvester $100, whereas fees paid by offshore northern shrimp harvesters operating under a
system of enterprise quotas equal $67.50 per metric tOime of quota. Thus, if the inshore fishery
operated along the same management regime, the costs to a harvester being issued a quota of
17
100-250 metric tonnes would be staggering for such a small enterprise; secondly, the issue of
inflexibility offered by IQ systems posed the second problem. Decker adds that a move from an
open, competitive fishery to IQs would mean fish harvesters would have no movement
whatsoever on their quotas and, in the case of a fish harvester being unable to harvest his quota,
the only options would be to introduce ITQs or leave the catch in the water (Decker 2011);
finally, enforcing the harvest posed the third problem. While the fishery operated on what
Decker refers to as the "Gentleman's Agreement,,17, the industry felt this could only last for so
long (Decker 2011).
The question was then asked, "Why not manage this fishery ourselves?" (Decker 201 1).
Representatives from each of the five fleets included in the northeast fishery (4R, 2J, 3K north,
3K sou'th and 3L) along with members of the FFAW all voted unanimously for a system of
shrimp caps that would see the quota divided in tllat each harvester is granted a cap for the
season and, beyond that cap, he is not to be paid for any further catch. A harvester can keep
fishing but will only be paid to the amount of the cap he is granted. Thus, fees are kept at a
minimum and the Union and fleet committees are able to adjust or bunlp caps throughout the
season if they see fit.
The committees negotiated the system with processing companies to include the system
as part of the collective agreement that governs the Union's workers. The companies added their
own input and, in their interest, asked that trip limits be enforced to avoid previous instances of
gluts. These trip limits are enforceable through the collective agreement (Decker 2011).
Along with the agreement the Union and harvesters developed both a database set up to
17 The "Gentleman's Agreement" simply refers to an informal agreement between a number of parties, Decker
refers to the "gentleman's agreement" in the industry as being oneofan honor system that went unquestioned
between harvesters, the union and processors.
18
manage the caps and to manage any tolerances l8 a harvester may have regarding his cap and a
website where a harvester is able to plug in his landings and fmd out the totals and tolerances for
hi caps and trip limits. Both of these initiatives were developed by the Union in conjunction
with input from harvesters (Decker 20 II).
Decker says that over the period since the cap system has been introduced over $40, 000,
000 has been saved in fees. Likewise, compliance has been positive as there have been no legal
charges in courts as the "rules are ours" to enforce (Decker 2011). Timely reporting by the
Union and harvesters has led to this system working well, as the Union will report to a company
that a harvester is in a potential "overrun" situation if the situation arises.
18Toseetheallocatedcapsandtolerancesfor2010(andpreviousyears) refer to the FFAW's website at
hltp://www.ffaw.netlpage/2010%20Yearly%20Harvesting%20Cap%20Summary.htm
19
5.0 Issues With Harvesting Caps and Individual Quota Regimes
5.i Why Use Harvesting Caps? The Debate Surrounding individual Quotas and individual
Transferable Quotas
As discussed by Decker (2011), avoidance of the issues presented by other regimes, such
as individual quotas, was the key reason harvesting caps were put in place to manage the newly-
emerging inshore northern shrimp industry on the northeast coast of the province. Individual
quotas (IQs) have been put in place as a management tool in numerous other lucrative fisheries
in Newfoundland and Labrador, such as snow crab. Copes (1986) defines the individual quota
as, "A fixed share of the catch allocated in advance to individual operators (i.e., recognized
fi hermen, fishing units or fishing enterprises). Allocations may be made for a single season
(e.g. year), for a longer period, or in perpetuity,,19 (Copes 1986:279). Whereas open access
draw out questions of overcapacity and overharvesting in a fishery that is common property,
the e allocations attempt to allay these worries by placing individual property rights on the
resource. Licensing limits the inputs in a fishery to control the harvest. Introduction of such
management tools as individual quotas control the output. This would, in rationale, put an end to
the "race to the fish" that could result if allocations were simply set as an overall total allowable
catch that, once reached, would signal the end of the harvest. Total allowable catch runs the risk
of a build-up of competitive fleets, severe overinvestment in manpower and equipment at the
19The maximum a license, and thus an allocation, can be held in Canada is a maximum of9 years.
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individual level (Copes 1986:279). Individual quotas attempt to slow down this race and allot a
percentage of the TAC20 to individual fish harvesters or enterprises.
Cope states that the main perceived benefit of introducing individual quotas to a fishery
is the elimination of potential diseconomies that come with open access and limited entry
licensing. The benefits include elimination of the desire to race for the fish before the TAC is
closed. The rationale is that fish harvesters will spread effort optimally over the season and
using manpower and equipment optimally, reducing the need for overinvestment, and safety will
al 0 be paramount as fish harvesters will no longer feel the need to fish in bad weather
conditions. The risk of gluts would also be lessened and harvesters would be able to take
advantage of patterns of demand in the marketplace (Copes 1986:280). As individual quotas are
a form of property rights some proponents argue that one innate benefit of property rights should
be the ability to transfer, by lease or sale, all or a portion of these rights to others. It is this
question of transferability that brings forth potential problems that are often discussed when
these management regimes are considered.
Transferability of quotas has been a topic of much debate and is one of the main issues
raised by theorists when asse sing the value of individual quotas as a management tool.
Defining a resource as 'property' through institution of quotas brings the potential that
transferability can allow such consequences of 'ownership' to occur. This ownership is what has
developed quotas into market commodities to be either fished or traded for profit. Arguments
both for and against transferring quotas most often weigh in on the experiences of nwnerous
fishing regions in using lndividual Transferrable Quotas.
Kingsley (2002) argues that ITQs allow a harvester to harvest freely, within a quota
2°lndividual quotas are, according to Copes, lIsually a percentage of the TAC and dictate the quantity of the TA a
harvester may take. While it is a percentage it is usually given as a set amount (Copes 1986:279).
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constraint, while also aiming to maximize net return in making the quota negotiable to the
harvester in regards to buying and selling (Kingsley 2002:649). "In practice," Eythorsson states,
'ITQ-management means turning catch quotas into a market commodity and a development of
private property rights to the resources" (Eythorsson 1996:269). Private property rights are
established and quotas become the property offish harvesters21 . These quotas are shares of the
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) that is set by a governing body, of which DFO is the body
responsible for such allocations in Canada. Fish harvesters are granted a pemlanent share of this
allocation that is theirs to catch, lease22 , sell or transfer as an independent commodity. Transfers
can be permanent or can be leases for a fixed amount of time. Those who argue for individual
transferrable quotas argue that such transferability is a solution to avoiding H. Scott Gordon's
predicted dire consequences of a common resource. The argument is that competition for the
resource will lead to overcapitalization and overcapacity in the harvesting sector. These
consequences were also addressed by Garrett Hardin (1968) who coined the teml 'tragedy of the
commons,23 to describe the tendency for overcapacity and overexploitation to result from open.
unregulated, access to a resource. Ownership of quotas should, in theory, offer an incentive for
fish harvesters to have long-teml health and sustainability of the stock in their interests (LeDrew
21 orne variations exist. The Icelandic Fisheries Management Act of 1990, for example, implements ITQs but also
tates that quotas are national property and rights are to the harvesting, not the resource (Eythorsson 1996:272).
22Leasingusually falls in one of four categories: quota exchange, or exchanging quotas of different species between
ve sels; contract fishing, or long-term contracts between vertically-integrated companies with quotas and vessel
owners without quotas that obligate harvesters to ensure the catch is delivered to the company for processing; quota
pooling,anothervarietyofcontractingwherethevesselownerdoes have quota but thus increases his quota; and
direct leasing, where quota is leased by boat owners, from the quota owner or a mediator, at market price
(Eythorsson 1996:273).
23Th is theory is based on the assumption that, bymakingresources private property, managers are able to eliminate
the negative effects of open access, namely exploitation ofstocks beyond capacity. Gordon stated that, "Most of the
problems associated with the words 'conservation' or'depletion'or'overexploitation' in the fishery are, in reality,
manifestations of the fact that natural resourcesoftheseayie Id no economic rent" (Gordon 1953:124). Similarly,
Feenyetal. state, "Privatization usually provides incentives for rational exploitation of the resource. If the owner
has property rights in the resource and those rights are tradable, boththeco t and the benefits will accrue to the
same owner and will be reflected in the market price of the resource, giving the owner the pecuniary incentive to
refrainfromdeslructiveuse"(FeenyetaI.1990:9).
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4).
The ITQ model as urnes theoretically that private property rights create an incentive to
harvest in a way that is sustainable and responsible; that transferability will eventually result in a
state of equilibrium (Chavez 2008:570) and "full economic efficiency" whereas the mo t
efficient fish harvesters remain and have bought out less efficient fish harvesters; increased
efficiency brings the possibility of collecting larger resource rent24 from the fisheries once stocks
are at optimal size and fishing effort is at an optimum level; that resource rent can be distributed
in a number of ways, including a build-up of private capital to be invested in other sectors of the
economy or by taxing the rent by charging for resource rentals that can be later redistributed to
less efficient fish harvesters to improve their economic condition; that market prices for quotas
will be indicative of the resource rent generated by a fishery, or expectations for future rent25 in
the case of permanent transfers; and, a fishery in optimal condition is more profitable and thus
crews have a better bargaining position (Eythersson 1996:270-1). The basic premise of the
system is, according to Wingard, that the rationalizing powers of the free market will pu h until
"the strong will buyout the weaker. Shares will go to the lowest cost or more efficient
producers. Inefficient fishers will be driven from the market" (Wingard 2000:49).
Yet, it is exactly this type of economic rationale that some fisheries managers say is the
downfall of the ITQ system, and transferring of quotas in general. There are many fisheries
managers and economists who argue that transfer of quotas is not a potential economic savior for
fisheries but is a method of allocation that bring externalities over the long term. The most
obvious of these effects is, as per the inherent economic rationale of transferable quotas, small
24"Resourcerent" isan economic term used similarly to the term " land rent" in agricultural economic literature.
Both terms refer to the market rent landowners collect fTom tenants on different qualities of land, with productive
areas bringing in the largest rent (Eythor son 1996:270-1).
250ecliningstocksgeneratelessrentwhilestocksthataregrowingandinoptimalconditionproducehigherrent.
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scale fish harvesters are often forced out of the industry as quotas are bought up by more
profitable, large scale enterprises or companies. Referring to Copes (1994), LeDrew states that,
"When quotas are transferable, individuals or companies with sufficient financial resources can
buy up quota from other holders, resulting in a progressive system of monopolization that is the
inevitable growth of capitalism" (LeDrew 6). Thus, as quotas are bought up by the most
profitable operations, fears of concentration of ownership and vertical integration rise.
Questions of distributional equity also rise as some boat owners are usually grandfathered
into a new quota system, meaning they are granted quotas at a low cost, if any cost at all, based
on their prior participation in the fishery before it was enclosed and allocated by quota systems.
Other new entrants and new applicants for quota are required to pay high amounts for access to a
fishery, which is not always financially feasible for a fish harvester who may not have been able
to accumulate enough personal capital to invest in a new enterprise. Similarly, as is most
obvious in the case of Iceland's operation under ITQs, an increase in quota volume that is
transferred has resulted in lease prices rising, often despite declining stocks. Eythorsson argues
that this is classic supply and demand, as high prices stem from low supply (Eythorsson
1996:274-5). The effect is similar to quota concentration in that smaller, more inefficient fish
harvesters are thus at risk of being "squeezed out" of the industry by larger enterprises and
companies if they cannot muster up the capital required to buy in to the industry or lease highly
priced quotas (LeDrew 6).
Copes (2000) goes into greater detail, specifying that the problems ofITQs can be traced
back to two source categories, namely management requirements of the system and behaviors
induced by the system. Firstly, management requirements includes TACs that are relatively
inflexible, leaving fish harvesters angered and frustrated ifDFO suggests closures or reductions
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may be required for conservation reasons. Fish harvesters who have left quota for the end of the
season may feel the need to push harder at the beginning of a subsequent season to try and
escape such an occurrence in following years. Thus, DFO may be hesitant to suggest closures or
reductions despite declining stocks and fish harvesters may begin to overfish in the early part of
the season (Copes 2000:7).
Secondly, Copes argues that ITQ systems include near-irreversible system commitments
in that "ITQs do not lend themselves easily to a risk-averse process of experimentation" (Copes
2000:9). His argument is that the initial allocation of property rights leads to a push for
subsequent alterations to these rights, such as non-transferable short-term quotas, longer term
quotas, short-term rentable quotas and quotas that can be traded permanently (Copes 2000:9).
He also argues that it would be very difficult to return to a state of common property once ITQ
systems have been put in place as fish harvesters would likely demand a buyback program for
quotas that were likely given to them for free or a very low price in the beginning of the system's
implementation. This is a very undesirable position for both taxpayers and government and thus
rever aJ would not be likely to occur (Copes 2000:9).
With regards to system-induced behaviors, the main concerns Copes refers to are quota
busting; high-grading; price dumping; ratcheting of quotas; discount-driven stock depletion and
data fouling. Quota busting simply refers to the difficulty in enforcing ITQ fisheries in that fish
harvesters may be driven to catch beyond their quota, especially in areas where there are
numerous landing sites. The result is a depletion of stocks and undue pressure on the
management system; high-grading refers to the incentive to discard fish that do not meet the
requirements of obtaining the highest price-per-pound; price dumping occurs when a fish
harvester dumps a catch after hearing a port's price has dropped so that the catch will not count
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against quota and with the hope that prices will be better on the next trip; ratcheting of quotas
refers to the pressure placed on fish managers by harvesters that often results in quotas being
ratcheted upward when stocks are decent but reductions in times of low stocks are unlikely due
to pressure from harvesters; discount-driven stock depletion is a process of rapidly fishing the
biomass ofa species and using the high profits of this species to buy up quota in other fisheries,
resulting in high immediate profits but with adverse effects on tocks; and finally, data fouling is
simply understating the real harvest by failing to report instances of poaching, quota busting and
other such practices (Copes 2000:6-12).
Thus, it is clear that individual transferrable quotas are favorable on paper but
problematic in practice. These fears are expressed often in discussions regarding quota regimes
that place a sense of ownership with allocations. It is, however, possible to curtail these fears if
we point out that inshore shrimp quotas in SFAs 5, 6 and 7 fall into a different category than
most quotas set by DFO in that it is a cap rather than an individual allocation. While the original
TAC set by DFO is then divided into quota per SFA, the final redistribution is done by the Fish,
Food and Allied Workers Union that represents the province's fish harvesters. This in itself is a
set of circumstances that allows shrimp caps to not fall under the heading of quotas that are
bought at high costs and run the risk of being commodified. Rather, shrimp caps are distributed
at a very low fee. The regime, however, brings questions of 'property' and 'access' to the fore. I
argue that harvesting caps may not harbor many of the same fears regarding commodification
and the creation ofa 'market' for quota. Yet, this management tool creates a new set of
circumstances that may open spaces for new issues to be addressed, issues surrounding the
regime's ability to control access to the resource.
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5.2 Harvesting Caps - Tlte Debate Surrounding Common Property and Open Access
Enclosure of the commons through state policy, such as licensing and subsequent quota
allocation regimes, is built on the theoretical arguments ofH. cot! Gordon (1954) and Garret
Hardin (1968) whose basic premise was that open access to a resource triggers a 'race to the
fi h', whereas enclosure and sub equent redistribution of the re ource will garner a sense of
re ponsibility from harvesters to preserve the resource and harvest it responsibly. By making a
common property resource 'private property' one assumes a sense of ownership over the
resource and thus one assumes a greater responsibility to ensure the resource is sustained.
Mansfield (2001), however, argues that this institution of property rights and
management regimes is problematic. She argues, "Property theorists overemphasize the
importance of property by positing a deterministic relationship between certain property regimes
and socioenvironmental outcomes... property structures may influence regimes of acces , but
property does not determine how people will use natural re ource (Mansfield 2001:386).
Mansfield contends that aiming for a sustainable resource through implementation of a particular
management regime may be too implistic. This, I argue, is one of the key i sue with how
harve ting caps have played out in the inshore ewfoundland and Labrador northern shrimp
fishery.
The 'tragedy of the commons' argument has long been the justification for the institution
of management regimes in the fishing industry. Hannesson (1991) argues that, "One of the mo t
robust results in economic theory is the theorem that common property resources will be
overexploited, possibly to the point of ultimate depletion" (Hannesson 1991 :40 I).
Overcapitalization and overcapacity are feared results ofa fishery that leave the harvest open to
all and lacks limits on input. Yet, while this theory may seem traightforward it is too linear and
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the fishery has illustrated that other trajectories may be at play. Man field makes an argument
for the "tragedy of open access' (Mansfield 2001 :387).
One of the more common misconceptions made by those who argue against open access
is the tendency to misinterpret open access and common property with to be the same type of
access. The two are not to be confu ed. While theorists who are guilty of this misconception
connect the absence of property rights to both concepts, the concept of 'property rights' in itself
is the key issue in understanding the difference between the two. Mansfield argues that common
property holds cultural and institutional rules regarding use, while open access is devoid of the e
limitations and regulatory 'rules' (Mansfield 2001 :387). As McCay and Acheson point out, "By
equating common property with open access, the tragedy-of-the-commons approach ignores
important social institutions and their roles in managing the commons" (McCay and Acheson
1987:34).
Thus, in failing to distingui h between the two the tragedy of the commons becomes
synonymous with the tragedy of open acce s, the main component of both being the
'''economically rational individual" who maximizes profit in the hort term" (Mansfield
2001 :387). Here, clo ing acces to the commons does not nece arily top open acces from
being a component of the resulting regime. Open access can still exist and the economically
rational individual is not nece arily the result. Rather, how one reacts to a situation of open
access is managed by forces eparate from rules put in place by regulatory bodies. The
individual, in this case the harve ter, is affected by specific cultural, political and economic
processes that may promote or constrain behaviour, the san1e roles and institutions pointed out
by McCay and Acheson. Mansfield argues that such emphasis can open up new kinds of
property relations, such as those in which multiple regimes can exist (Man field 2001 :388).
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State property managed as open access is one such hybrid regime and one in which we can
encompass the current system of harvesting caps off the northeast coast of ewfoundland and
Labrador.
Harvesting caps are not, as one would believe, a strictly managed regime of allocations.
Unlike individual quotas, harvesting caps create a highly competitive fishery and are recognized
by DFO as such. While cap limits are set per vessel, the over-allocation of the resource through
these caps encourages harvesters to 'race to the fish' to harvest their share in a manner that i not
spread out over the entire season. Rather, harvesters must harvest quickly for fear that certain
areas may be closed in the near future. This harvesting pattern is evident in that Newfoundland
and Labrador plants still experience gluts in landings during certain periods of the harvest. The
competitive nature of harvesting caps results in such gluts and, despite the fact that processors
have attempted to adjust to these peak times. High capital and operating costs still occur, along
with excess capacity. High inventory carrying costs also result as proces ors must buy when
product is available, during what is a short timeframe in Newfoundland and Labrador (Gardiner
Pinfold 2006:27). There is a need to address these issues, given that the track record of
harvesting caps has not necessarily been flawless? Mansfield (2007) offers a potential route to
take. Could co-management offer the necessary tools to allow harvesters to maintain a sense of
autonomy in how the resource is managed while putting a set of regulations in place to alleviate
current pressures to 'race to the fish'?
The role of communities and harvesters in managing natural resources has come to the
fore in contemporary debate regarding allocations and management regimes (Mansfield 2007).
Terms such as 'co-management' and 'community-based management' begin to offer new
direction for managers of fisheries. The value of such regimes is best illustrated with a brief
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discussion of two such types of management regimes, that of community transferable quotas
(CTQs) and community development quotas (CDQs). This discussion can illustrate parallel
between these regimes and Newfoundland and Labrador's shrimp caps that indicate how the
current system may be adjusted to best serve the industry.
5.3 The Value ofCo-Managemelit and Commullity-Based Managemellt ill Fisheries
A brief mention of co-management and community-based management can be valuable
here in understanding the ideology behind the current system of inshore harvesting caps in SFAs
5,6 and 7. Copes and Charles (2004) define community-based management as "a method or
ystem of management in which harvester and community interests have a significant role in the
management of fishery resources ... [and] local organizations clearly define and share specific
management responsibilities and authority" (Copes and Charles 2004: 172). The goal of
distributing authority to the community is to "devolve power from central agencies, while
empowering and building capacity within communities to manage local fisheries resources in a
more sustainable manner" (Thompson 2008:413). Key factors to succes ful community-based
management regimes include active involvement and support of the wider community.
legislation from government that grants authority to the community to create a community board
that represents stakeholders. This board is also responsible for the designation within the
community of various roles. This framework weighs in on economic, environmental and social
factors in making decisions regarding the resource (Copes and Charles 2004:172). Yet, Copes
and Charles also point out that distribution of the resource is then left up to the community and
can be done so in a variety of manners, even as 1TQs. In recent years there has been discussion
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of a different type of distributional framework, that of community transferrable quotas.
Community transferrable quotas are often tied in with the idea of community-based
management and are worthy of note. Community transferable quotas refer to a system of quota
allocations that are granted to a geographically defined area, usually based on a historical
reliance upon a fishery. Copes (1997) offers that such a system may serve as a solution to the
inherent risk of concentration that comes with regular enclosure and quotas. Copes argues that
regionally-based allocation systems such as community transferrable quotas may help "protect
access by small fishing communities, or clusters of such communities, to locally available stocks
on which they have long relied and to which they may claim a customary right of access. Such
access rights .. would assign community priority rights to fish harvests in a geographically
defined area .. the community quota normally would be available only to fishing tmits based in
the commwlity" (Copes 1997:8-9). Wingard argues that such quota allocations to commwlities
grant flexibility in distribution and guarantee access to the fishery, therefore enhancing economic
stability in the community (Wingard 2000:53).
Likewise, Becky Mansfield (2007), in examining the case of Community Development
Quotas (CDQ) in Western Alaska, makes a similar argument to the one proposed here with
regard to harvesting caps: the management regime seems to be conceptually conflicted. The
regime both encloses the resource for privatization and release into the market at the same time
as it attempts to redistribute the resource in a marmer that is fair and keeps sustainability and
socio-economic goals of harvesters in mind. The Alaskan CDQs are distributed to aboriginal
communities to manage and subsequently harvest or lease as they see fit. All at once the quotas
not only allow groups who may be alienated from the marketplace to have a way in but also
ensures a sense of social justice in that it ensured these groups are allocated a sufficient amount
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of quota to support their needs. Mansfield argues that this ideology is conflicted in that it creates
a reliance on the market while attempting to protect from the market. I, however, argue that
harvesting caps, if managed in a way that resembled this regime, may do the same for harvesters
in Newfoundland and Labrador who are now harvesting under the cap system.
5.4 The Potentia/for Newfound/and and Labrador Shrimp Caps to be Adjusted to Co-
Managed "Community" Quotas
Harvesting caps and Community-based quota allocations do share similarities.
Community-based co-management is "a people-centered, community-oriented, resources-based
partnership approach to fisheries management in which government agencies, the community of
local resource users, non-government organizations, and other stakeholders share the
responsibility and authority for the management ofa fishery" (Thompson 2008:413). While
Newfoundland and Labrador's system of managing the shrimp fishery by the cap system is not
the picture-perfect definition of co-management, it is argued that shrimp caps can be considered
as a skewed type of this regime, even relating to systems ofself-governance26. By setting the
total allowable catch and then turning the distribution over to the FFAW, the federal government
has allowed the fish harvesters, plant workers and other members of the Union to have a say in
how shrimp caps are allocated. While the "community" does not meet and make these decisions,
the FFAW represents approximately 20, 000 workers in Newfoundland and Labrador (FFAW,
20 II). Thus, the FFAW is seen as an appropriate representative of the wishes and needs of
Newfoundland and Labrador's fishing communities.
26Self-governance,accordingtoYangetal.(2010),referstousers managing the resource within a given
framework. The framework "pushes 'fishers to decide on own operating regime but within a framework established
by government that is applied to all fisheries.' Thus self-governance is about commercial palticipantsmaking
governance decisions" (Yangetal. 2010:262).
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Yet, harvesting caps, while seemingly operating as other quota regimes in how access
and allocations are restricted and limited, create problems inherent in the regime that most
regimes tend to try and restrict. The largest question looming is whether harvesting caps rein in
the 'race to the fish' as most property regimes do. Given that caps are over allocated the season
in a particular area may be closed with very little warning if state officials feel the need. Thus,
two harvesters may be granted the same cap but, depending on their choice of harvesting time,
one may harvest his cap fully while the other is shut out of the area after a small number of trips.
There is an inherent desire, then, to once again race to the fish as a great degree of uncertainty
rests with a regime in which one's season is not guaranteed. The most commonly identified
problem in the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry, that of too many harvesters chasing
too little fish, is amplified as one would undoubtedly aim to be as productive as possible and
harvest to the best of one's ability. The potential for sustainability and responsible harvesting of
the resource go out the window.
According to a recent article, fishery researchers at the University of Washington argue
that group management of fisheries are more likely to be sustained if using a co-management
model. The system of harvesting caps as distributed by the FFAW, with minor adjustments, can
be placed in this category. Their study was based on the hypothesis that government
management alone is often not sufficient, namely in smaller, local fisheries as some fisheries are
too small to allow sufficient government resources to be applied to them. Analyzing more than
130 fisheries in 44 countries, researchers concluded that management regimes that included both
government and local fish harvesters offered a promising future. Small scale fisheries in Atlantic
Canada were included in the sample studied by the researchers. In an attempt to allay age-old
fears regarding allowing fish harvesters to have a say in their own stocks, co-author Ray Hilborn
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is quoted in the article as saying, "Many people believe that having fishermen involved in the
management process is letting the fox guard the henllouse. What (this research) shows isjust the
opposite, that the more involved the fishing industry is in management, the better the outcome"
(Chai, 2011). The conclusions reached by the team of researchers offered that such a co-
management regime must, however, include a leader who enforces guidelines, community input,
and ownership over specified areas for harvest as conservation must be first and foremost. When
incorporated into local fishing industries these components led to less illegal fishing behaviours,
increased resources and higher profits (Chai, 2011).
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6.0 Analysis
The key discussion point of this paper is that an analysis of harvesting caps as a system of
resource management that is an alternative to more popular regimes, such as individual
transferable quotas, opens up questions that have been asked since the beginning of regulated
fisheries: namely, what is the most economically-, socially-, and environmentally-responsible
method of regulating a harvest and, can a harvest be sustained under a certain regime? In
comparing other quota regimes with co-management, community-based management and the
current cap system that teeters on the edge of each of the latter two management regimes, we are
able to gauge where this method of management falls with regards to efficiency and
conservation.
These comparisons and subsequent discussion of the current northeastern Newfoundland
and Labrador system indicate that, while pros and cons exist within each of the regulatory
methods, a careful regulatory system defining allocations between harvesters but also allowing
harvesters and their networks to have a sense of autonomy in how the resource is managed, can
help diminish the race to the fish that is inherent in competitive, open fisheries. Analysis opens
up a set of questions that are raised by this brief exan1ination and questions of potential
amendments that can be made to the current regime to best benefit all in the northeastern
Newfoundland and Labrador shrimp industry.
The system of shrimp caps that is quasi-eo-managed by the FFAW, and the harvesters it
represents, has had a positive impact on the northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador shrimp
industry. Yet, questions remain regarding whether or not allowing a more official co-
management system of allocations brings with it the many dangers associated with other systems
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enclosure, such as individual transferable quotas. Questions can also be raised regarding
whether or not the current system can be adjusted to better benefit the harvesters and companies
involved. In an industry plagued recently by cutbacks, price drops and tie_ups27, is there a way
to make the system work better for those involved?
ITQs and community-based management regimes differ in philosophy. Whereas ITQ
systems rely heavily on individual gain and the marketplace, community-based management
offers a role for the wider comn1lmity in making decisions within the industry. ITQs are driven
by market forces and aim to maximize individual or corporate profits from a resource that is
"owned" and limited by the economic state of the market at a given time. Equity, conservation,
community welfare and sustainability have long been considered to be in conflict with profit
maximization (Copes and Charles 2004: 173). Community-based regimes, however, combine
human requirements with the social, biological and economic needs of a given region. Despite
ITQs being hailed as one of the most profitable means of fishery management in that quotas are
generally granted at little or no cost in the initial stages of allocation and then leased or sold for a
large profit gain, community-based management systems in which limited entry and tradable
fishing licensing are aspects of the state-managed framework can be just as profitable when the
value of both quota and license are weighed together (Copes and Charles 2004: 174).
It is the question of marketing these privileges that is of most importance in the majority
of discussions surrounding the long-term sustainability ofa fishery. LeDrew's discussion of
community transferrable quotas discusses transferring quotas granted to these regions, with the
transfer occurring within a group or region. He states the importance of establishing a state-
managed framework that would determine the type of exchange that is permissible. These
regulations would ensure that the same inherent problem of concentration that exists within the
27 Fora recent example of such a protest see CAW, 2009.
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ITQ system does not occur on a smaller scale within the group (LeDrew 9). Fear of creating a
'market' in which the perceived value of a quota, an intangible piece of 'property', begins to
concentrate wealth into the hands ofa select few do not have to materialize into reality if those
making the decisions have an equal interest in the harvest. While shrimp caps within the
Newfoundland and Labrador northern shrimp industry are most certainly not commw1ity
transferable quotas, the two systems share common threads, namely that they are both
regional/divisional allocations that are not given market value and are not comrnoditized. These
commonalities allow us to view the parallels between both that indicate a system of transferring
quotas between fish harvesters within the same fleet may be beneficial.
Copes (2000) suggests that compromises can be reached by management regimes that
help alleviate certain pressures oflTQ systems. He lists "trip limits" (Copes 2000:7) as one such
measure, a regulation already in place by the management of Newfoundland and Labrador's
shrimp industry. While Copes' argwnent is that such measures are against the efficiency
argwnents ofITQs, trip limits do, as Decker (2011) argues and I concur, help maintain an
equality over the course of a fishing season. In doing so, the season is broken up and judgment
is able to be made at set periods to assess stock conditions, harvesting levels, and can also help
DFO and fish harvesters decide if quota will be likely left in the water. If harvesters are able to
have a larger say in how these assessments take place and have greater autonomy in these
decisions, the potential for Hardin and Gordon's age-old theory, that a harvester with a personal
interest in a resource is more likely to harvest responsibly, becomes a closer reality.
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7.0 Conclusion
A working group put in place to review the shrimp industry in 2002 -03 found that
harvesting activity was not spread out over the entirety of the shrimp harvesting season but was
highest in late spring, early summer. The group found that landings generally reached 'glut'
status over a three month period. The high concentration of harvesting in such small periods was
attributed to interest in other species, weather conditions, harvesting 'caps', higher cOlmts and
port prices. Referring to caps, specifically, the group found that in areas such as SFA 7 caps
were lo~8 Harvesters were only able to make a small number of trips before their cap had been
harvested (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2003), illustrating the point made earlier that the
current system is not lessening the desire to race to the fish but is, in reality, triggering it.
Harvesting caps, as they now stand, are not a closed access fishery in the theoretical
sense but are managed beyond the initial setting of the caps. While the data collection stages of
the harvest are thoroughly managed through the FFAW's website and the timely reporting of
processors and harvesters, the ideological failures of the regime open spaces for adjustment.
Harvesting caps offer harvesters the opportunity to push for high output in the early stages of the
season, rather than spreading out their efforts. The sacrifice here is the potential for harvesting at
a time when shrimp are not of optimal quality. Smaller, softer shrimp bring lower prices. A
greater opportunity for discarding thus opens up, as harvesters may attempt to dWllP poor quality
shrimp in the hopes of keeping only larger shrimp that will bring higher revenue. Dumping these
smaller shrimp, already dead, increases the number of shrimp taken from the water. These cast
off shrimp are not recorded and this activity, though not permitted in the fishery, can occur. If
28Caps in this area have since increased but do remain lower than other areas as TACs in this inshore fishery have
seen a steady decline in recent years.
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this is the case, sustainability is risked.
Yet, issues such as quota busting, high grading and data fouling are more problematic
within ITQ systems. These problems are inherent in allocation systems based on market value
and capital. Quotas are given market value and are valuable possessions. In a cap system this is
not so, as caps are redistributed to fleets, ensuring the same amount of the TAC remains within
the specific fleet, and caps are not bought or leased as they still have no market value. Caps are
not purchased for high licensing costs and then bartered as such, but rather are allotted by the
fish harvesters and the Union that represents them. If caps remain in the same fleet there is no
more danger of overfishing or overcrowding than existed in the beginning, as the same amount
of product will be harvested from that SFA. The potential for concentration ifmore profitable
enterprises attempt to 'lease' quotas is also not evident as caps are managed by the measures of
harvesters themselves, not the pressures of the market.
This, combined with the fact that many fleets in Newfoundland and Labrador rely heavily
on both northern shrimp and snow crab and must balance the season to harvest both species
responsibly, opens a space where we can begin to ask if tweaking the current cap system may
prove to be economically, biologically and socially feasible for both the industry and individual
fish harvesters? Harvesters would be able to spread out the harvest and not feel pressured to
'race to the fish'.' More product would be landed in processing plants in Newfoundland and
Labrador that are often short on product at times, and glutted in other, and unable to provide the
number of hours workers are required to work to meet the requirements of unemployment
insurance benefits.
"Thus, the question surrounding the harvesting cap system is whether or not the
management regime can be seen as fully reaching the potential of what a system of property
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rights and enclosure proposes. While proponents of enclosure of common property argue that
doing so halts the tendency to fish a resource quickly and without regard, all in the name of
maximization of one's fishing ability and profit, does the harvesting cap system offer the sanle
type of roadblocks to overfishing? The answer is a resounding no. While the initial stages of
quota allocations by DFO do begin to allocate the resource along the lines of a limited entry,
competitive fishery, what results from the over-allocation and secondary division of the TAC
into harvesting caps is a rush to gain ones portion of the harvest before the season is cut to an
abrupt end. Harvesters in SFA 6 saw this occur quite early in August of2011. In such a case
some harvesters may fish their cap to finality while some others, who have held out and not
fished shrimp until later in the season (gear troubles, fishing other species, etc.) may be
embarking on their first trip only to find the area closed.
The 'race to the fish' is not halted but is very real. While we are seeing a greater onus in
the industry in matters of sustainability and responsibility, socio-economic pressures may come
to the forefront when a harvester is making a decision to harvest his catch before the next
harvester gets there first. It is not, for instance, uncommon for shrimp plants to be glutted with
incoming shrimp to the extent of having to put its fleet in queue and keeping vessels tied up.
This is an attempt to limit the amount of catch being landed (Street, personal communication).
Avoiding such gluts was one reason David Decker gave in moving the fishery in 1997 from an
open, temporary fishery to a closed, competitive quota harvest (Decker, personal
communication).
If community transferable quotas have proven themselves to be feasible in other regions,
the question remains to be asked as to why such a management regime carmot work within the
Newfoundland and Labrador fleets fishing for northern shrimp. The importance of having a
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state-managed framework that governs resource management and allocations is certainly very
evident. Yet, the knowledge and infornlation harvesters possess can prove a valuable tool in
how the resource can be managed in to the future as to not meet the fate of past fisheries that
have collapsed beyond renewal.
The questions raised here illustrate the importance of reviewing current policies
regarding allocations of northern shrimp in Newfoundland and Labrador. While the direction the
industry has gone in terms of allowing allocations beyond the setting of the TAC to be handled
by the industry, a review should be conducted now that this management system is beyond the
initial stages. The questions opened up here offer a potential direction that fishery managers can
take to keep the current allocation system and the importance of having the industry involved in
allocations. There is also potential to alter the system in a way that allows harvesters to reap
further gains from the industry. In a fishery that is often plagued with debate and issues, such as
protests and tie_ups29, co-management might be an ideal avenue for managers to take. In
allowing communjties and harvesters to have further autonomy in the managing of shrimp caps
managers can help avoid the effects that are known to plague other quota regimes, such as quota
concentration and distributional equity.
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Appendix 1
A History of Total Allowable Catclt (TAC) Allocations in tlte Nortltern Sltrimp Industry
YEA DIVOA DIVO DIVO HS/ DIV2 HOP CAR HAW DIV3 DIV3 TOTA
R -11 A B UB* G E T KE K L L
SFAO SFAI SFA2 SFA SFA4 SFAS SFA6 SFA73
1978 - 1,000 100 500 4,50 800 800 500 8,2000
1979 - 2,000 100 500 3,20 800 1,750 500 8,8500
1980 - 2,500 200 500 4,00 800 850 500 9,3500
1981 - 5,000 200 500 4,00 800 850 500 11,8500
1982 - 5,000 200 500 4,00 800 850 500 11,8500
1983 - 5,000 850 500 4,00 800 850 500 12,5000
1984 5,000 850 500 3,50 700 850 500 11,9000
1985 6,120 850 500 2,80 770 850 500 12,3900
1986 6,120 850 500 3,40 1,000 850 1,200 13,9200
1987 6,120 1,20 500 4,00 800 1,500 1,500 15,6200 0
1988 6,120 1,20 500 4,00 800 1,500 1,500 156200 0
1989 7,520 3,500 1,20 2,580 4,40 1,600 2,000 3,600 26,4000 0
1990 7,520 3,500 1,20 2,580 4,40 1,600 2,000 3,600 26,4000 0
1991 8,500 3,485 1,19 2,635 4,76 1,615 2,210 2,091 26,4860 0
1992 8,500 3,485 1,19 2,635 4,76 1,615 3,910 3,655 29,7500 0
1993 300 8,500 3,485 1,19 2,735 4,76 1,615 3,846 5,334 31,7650 0
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1994 500 8,500 3,500 1,20 4.000 7,650 11,050 36,4000
1995 500 8,500 3,500 1,20 5,200 7,650 11,050 37,6000
1996 500 8,500 3,500 3,80 5,200 7,650 11,050 40,2000
1997 500 8,500 5,250 3,80 5,200 15,300 23,100 61,6500
1998 500 7,650 5,250 3,80 8,320 15,300 46,200 87,0200
1999 500 9,350 8,750 3,80 8,320 15,300 58,632 104,650 2
2000 500 9,350 5,250 3,80 8,320 15,300 61,632 500 109,150 2
2001 500 12,04 8,750 3,80 8,320 15,300 61,632 500 115,340 0 2
2002 500 12,04 8,750 6,30 8,320 15,300 61,632 500 117,840 0 2
2003 500 14,16 8,750 6,30 13,12 33,084** 85,585** 10,83 172,347 0 2** 3 1
2004 500 14,16 8,750 6,30 10,32 23,300 77,932 10,83 152,107 0 0 3 2
2005 500 18,41 8,750 6,30 10,32 23,300 78,044 10,83 156,467 0 0 3 4
18,41 6,30 10,23 18,33 163,232006 500 7 8,726 0** 8 23,300 77,417 3 1
HS/UB = P. montagui
Between 1996 and 2001 there has been a 1200 t quota but a 3800 t catch limit for P.
montagui in SFA 3. During 2002 the SFA 3 P. montagui catch limit was increased to
6300 t.
** The offshore licence holders requested that their quotas starting in 2003 run from
April 1 - March 31 rather than January I - December 31, therefore the increased quotas
for 2003 reflect the amount of shrimp that would have been caught under the Dec. -
Jan. schedule. Please note that the change in timetable only affects SFAs 2,3,4,5 & 6.
SFAs 1 and 7 are still on the Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 timetable.
***In 2006 a 400 t P. borealis bycatch limit was set within the SFA 3 P. montagui
fishery.
(Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2007).
Appendix II
Shrimp product Value 1995-2005
Shrimp Product value
500,000 -r------------------,
:~~:~~~ :=========:==.....~~~=~~:====:==========:
350,000 +------=-....----~~>-r---'-~-.---,~=---..--,,-~-=-&:.--------.... 1
300,000 +--------'----------.. ---&---1
250,000 ~ • .. ~ ~ _... ....'" ......
200,000 - ~ -:!' _--n
150,OOO~~# ~
1~~:~~~ • _• _..,
o 1995119961199711998[1999120001200112002120031200412005
[- • ·Inshore 75,93176,05193,351188,91233,41234,11169,4[217,0 1189,61229,71198,3
I· Offshore 129,51123,01152,01194,51207,51172,61164,41164,61147,11146,61168,6
1- -~- -Total 205,4 199,1 245,4 383,5441,0406,8 333,9 381,6 336,8376,4 366,9
(Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2007)
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